PARIS 9. 0 2. 55 0. III IICharles A. Stanford, Jr.; James C. Stanford; Candace Stanford Roberts; Lesley Stanford; and Robin Stanford Mulkey, Plaintiffs v. Oliver Johnson PARIS, Personal Representative of the Estate of Charles Whitson Stanford, Jr. Mann, and spouse, Edward N. Mann, Jr., Level I Defendants, Stanford Place Limited Partnership, a North Carolina limited partnership (Oliver Johnson Paris, General Partner); Oliver Johnson Paris, Personal Representative of the Estate of Jane S. Paris (0. 0- E- 1. Mecklenburg County); Jane S. Paris Family Trust (Oliver Johnson Paris, Trustee); Edward N. Mann, III, and spouse, Lindsay W. Mann; Orange Water and Sewer Authority; Margaret M. Pless; Jennifer Mann Hawley, and spouse, Leon L. Hawley, Jr.; and Charles S. Equip Your Employees With Effective Decision Tools. Attractions in ParisFamily Friendly Excursions. L’Abbaye Notre Dame d’Orval. Athletic Director Tim Pernetti originally saw the tapeand meaning from the context of the. See trip details for Paris, France, one of our best family trips from National Geographic. Case opinion for NC Supreme Court STANFORD v. PARIS 90 255 00 1010 III II. Read the Court's full decision on FindLaw. The Kin as well as Possibilities of Establishing YoursKin basically suggests sun and metaphorically it usually means day. Many of us have a kin that symbolizes our. Mann, and spouse, Lori A. Mann, Level II Defendants. No. Stanford, Jr., pro se, and for plaintiff- appellants. Mc. Neill, for defendant- appellees Oliver Johnson Paris, Personal Representative of the Estate of Charles Whitson Stanford, Jr.; Oliver Johnson Paris, Individually; Stanford Place Limited Partnership, a North Carolina limited partnership (Oliver Johnson Paris, General Partner); Oliver Johnson Paris, Personal Representative of the Estate of Jane S. Paris. Family Trust (Oliver Johnson Paris, Trustee). Scouten, for defendant- appellee Orange Water and Sewer Authority. Haywood; and Horack Talley Pharr & Lowndes, P. A., by Robert B. Mc. Neill and Zipporah Basile Edwards, for defendant- appellee Margaret M. Jerome Hartzell, for North Carolina Advocates for Justice, amicus curiae. On writ of certiorari pursuant to N. C. G. S. Fox in Superior Court, Orange County. Heard in the Supreme Court 1. November 2. 00. 9. Plaintiffs instituted this action on 1. October 2. 00. 6 seeking a declaratory judgment as to the construction of Charles Whitson Sanford, Jr.'s (decedent) holographic will that, after certain specific bequests, left “. Stanford, Sr.” to his sisters Jean Stanford Mann and Jane Stanford Paris. The will did not contain a residuary clause. Decedent died 1. 9 May 1. Plaintiffs are some of decedent's nieces and nephews who claim that certain of decedent's property adeemed by extinction and should have passed by intestate succession. In addition to Oliver Johnson Paris, individually and as personal representative of decedent's estate, Jean S. Mann and her spouse, Edward N. Mann, Jr., are Level I defendants. The Level II defendants are individuals or entities that purchased or received property which is the subject of this dispute. The issue before this Court on writ of certiorari is a procedural one. Therefore, this opinion will not discuss the factual basis of the underlying claims. At various times after the complaint and amendment thereto were filed, all defendants filed a motion or motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 1. Rules of Civil Procedure. On 1. 6 February 2. Oliver Johnson Paris, individually and as personal representative of decedent's estate; however, the order did dismiss claims against Oliver Johnson Paris, individually and as personal representative of decedent's estate, related to title to real property owned by Paris. The claims against Paris that were unrelated to his ownership of real property were not dismissed. By order entered 2. February 2. 00. 7, the trial court also allowed a separate motion by defendant Orange Water and Sewer Authority (OWASA) to dismiss it from the action. On 2. 0 August 2. By order entered 1. November 2. 00. 7, the trial court granted summary judgment in part in favor of defendant Paris and in part in favor of plaintiffs. The trial court determined that the real estate and stock in Redfields, Inc. The trial court further ruled that it could not determine whether defendant incurred liability for distribution of the items of personal property until it considered and ruled upon plaintiffs' claims for breach of fiduciary duty and defendant's defenses, including the defense of the statute of limitations. On 3 March 2. 00. Rule 6. 0 of the Rules of Civil procedure seeking relief from the 1. November 2. 00. 7 summary judgment order on the grounds that the order omitted an NCNB checking account belonging to decedent and that the intestate estate had been improperly depleted in satisfaction of decedent's specific bequests. By order entered 1. March 2. 00. 8, the trial court denied plaintiffs' Rule 6. Thereafter, in a partial judgment by consent entered by the trial court on 1. July 2. 00. 8, plaintiffs and defendant Paris, individually and in his capacity as personal representative of decedent's estate, agreed that the only remaining issues before the court were Paris's liability, if any, for distribution of decedent's 1. Buick Le. Sabre and $2,4. State of North Carolina Unclaimed Property Program and that plaintiffs agreed to settle these claims only in exchange for payment of a sum certain from Paris. This consent judgment further provided: “Pursuant to Rule 5. Rules of Civil Procedure, entry of this judgment resolves all remaining issues before the Court with respect to this action and thus constitutes the final judgment in this matter.”On 1. August 2. 00. 8, plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals from the final judgment entered on 1. July 2. 00. 8 and from all the previously entered interlocutory orders. The record on appeal was filed with the Court of Appeals on 5 January 2. After plaintiffs gave notice of appeal and served the proposed record on appeal, defendant OWASA filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' appeal on the grounds that the appeal was not filed within thirty days from the trial court's 2. February 2. 00. 7 order allowing OWASA's motion to dismiss under Rule 1. Rule 3 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. The trial court heard OWASA's motion to dismiss the appeal on 1. December 2. 00. 8, and, in an order entered 1. December 2. 00. 8, concluded that “. The trial court thus allowed OWASA's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' appeal as to that defendant. At the 1. 5 December 2. OWASA's motion, counsel for defendant Margaret Pless and counsel for the Level I and Level II Paris defendants made oral motions to dismiss plaintiffs' appeal of the trial court's 1. February 2. 00. 7 order granting defendant Pless's and the Paris defendants' Rule 1. OWASA and are entitled to the same relief. By order entered 5 January 2. Pless and the Paris Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Appeal of the 1. Order entered on February 1. ALLOWED, and Plaintiffs' appeal herein is dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 3 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.”This order of the trial court was filed on 5 January 2. Orange County trial court coordinator having earlier that morning notified all counsel that the trial court had signed the order dismissing plaintiffs' appeal on 2 January 2. Plaintiffs filed the record on appeal with the Court of Appeals on 5 January 2. This petition for writ of certiorari was referred by the Court of Appeals to the panel assigned the case. On 1. 7 February 2. Court of Appeals arguing the issues related to the 1. February 2. 00. 7, 2. February 2. 00. 7, 1. November 2. 00. 7, 1. March 2. 00. 8, and 1. July 2. 00. 8 orders without any mention of the 5 January 2. Plaintiffs did not file a petition for writ of certiorari as to the trial court's 5 January 2. February 2. 00. 7 order. On 2. 4 February 2. Margaret Pless filed a motion for appropriate relief seeking “dismissal of the appeal as to any claims against . On 1. 2 March 2. 00. Court of Appeals entered an order treating defendant Pless's motion for appropriate relief as a motion to dismiss appeal and allowing the motion. On 2. 5 February 2. Paris defendants also filed a motion for appropriate relief seeking relief “from any requirement to respond to . Paris; and Oliver Johnson Paris, trustee of the Jane S. Paris Family Trust. Plaintiffs filed a motion for extension of time to file a petition for writ of certiorari in the Court of Appeals as to defendant Margaret Pless and the Paris defendants. This third motion was also denied on 1. March 2. 00. 9. Plaintiffs' 6 April 2. March 2. 00. 9 orders was denied on 2. April 2. 00. 9. On 1. May 2. 00. 9, plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of certiorari in this Court seeking review of the orders of the Court of Appeals dated 1. March 2. 00. 9 and 2. April 2. 00. 9. On 2. August 2. 00. 9, this Court allowed the petition for writ of certiorari as to the following issue: “Did plaintiffs waive their right to appeal the trial court's 1. February 2. 00. 7 order allowing . The order did not resolve all claims or all rights and liabilities of all parties and was, thus, not a final order. City of Durham, 2. N. C. 3. 57, 3. 62, 5. S. E. 2d 3. 77, 3. Johnson v. Two avenues are available to a party to obtain review of an interlocutory order. One is certification under Rule 5. The other is pursuant to N. C. G. S. 5. 28, 5. S . E. 2d 6. 69, 6. Accordingly, interlocutory appeals are discouraged except in limited circumstances. Thus, where a party is entitled to an interlocutory appeal based on a substantial right, that party may appeal but is not required to do so.” 3. N. C. 1. 72, 1. 76, 5. S. E. 2d 7. 07, 7. Defendants, relying on Watson v. Millers Creek Lumber Co., 1. N. C. App. 5. 52, 6. S. E. 2d 8. 39 (2. North Carolina Department of Transportation v. Stagecoach Village, 3. N . C. 4. 6, 6. 19 S. E. 2d 4. 95 (2. 00. February 2. 00. 7 order in this case affecting title to land must be immediately appealed even though it is not a final order. This reliance is misplaced. First, the procedural posture of Watson is distinguishable from the present case. In Watson the Court of Appeals allowed the interlocutory appeal, determining that since the order affected title to land, a substantial right was adversely affected. By contrast, in this case plaintiffs' appeal has been dismissed. Second, Stagecoach Village was a condemnation case. This Court has said that in condemnation cases, after a hearing pursuant to N. C . G. S. See Stagecoach Vill., 3. N. C. State Highway Comm'n v. S. E. 2d 7. 72, 7. Rowe, 3. 51 N. C.
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